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Abstract 
This paper uses a difference-in-difference estimator to test whether the introduction of patient 
choice and hospital competition in the English NHS in January 2006 has prompted hospitals 
to become more efficient.  Efficiency was measured using hospitals’ average length of stay 
(LOS) for patients undergoing elective hip replacement.  LOS was broken down into its two 
key components: the time from a patient’s admission until their surgery and the time from 
their surgery until their discharge. Our results illustrate that hospitals exposed to competition 
after a wave of market-based reforms took steps to shorten the time patients were in the 
hospital prior to their surgery, which resulted in a decrease in overall LOS.  We find that 
hospitals shortened patients’ LOS without compromising patient outcomes or by operating on 
healthier, wealthier or younger patients.  Our results suggest that hospital competition within 
markets with fixed prices can increase hospital efficiency.   
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been significant interest globally in sharpening the financial incentives within 
public services like health care and education in an effort to improve quality and efficiency.  
To that end, over the last decade, policy-makers in England have introduced sweeping 
reforms to the National Health Service (NHS) that have centered on expanding patient choice 
and hospital competition (Department of Health, 2005b).  Previous research suggests that the 
recent introduction of hospital competition in the English NHS has catalyzed improvements 
in hospital quality (Cooper et al., 2010).  This paper assesses the extent to which competition 
in the English NHS has increased hospital efficiency. 
There were three central elements to the market-based reforms to the English NHS, 
which were implemented from 2002 onwards (Department of Health, 2002).  First, beginning 
in 2002, the government introduced a fixed price, prospective reimbursement system known 
as Payment by Results (PbR) to pay for hospital care.  That new reimbursement system 
became fully operational in 2005.  Second, around the same time, the government took 
dramatic steps to diversity the hospital sector and increase hospitals’ freedom from central 
control.  Along those lines, the government actively encouraged private sector providers to 
enter the market and offer care to NHS patients alongside traditional NHS hospitals, in 
addition to rewarding high performing NHS hospitals with additional fiscal and managerial 
autonomy.  Third, beginning in 2006, every NHS patient in England was given the 
opportunity to choose their secondary care provider if they required surgical care.  Policy-
makers hoped this increase in hospital competition within a market with fixed prices would 
incentivize hospitals to improve their quality and increase their efficiency in order to garner 
additional revenue (Department of Health, 2005b).   
To analyze the impact of competition on hospital efficiency, we use a difference-in-
difference estimator to test whether hospitals in located in less concentrated markets 
responded more aggressively to the new prospective reimbursement system and shortened 
their average, annual length of stay (LOS) for patients undergoing elective hip replacement 
after the introduction of hospital competition in January 2006. Often, because of the 
inadequacy of cost data in health services research, LOS is frequently used as a proxy for 
efficiency (Fenn and Davies, 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996).  In England, since each 
additional bed day from 2006 onwards reduces hospitals’ revenue by £248.00, providers 
faced significant incentives to discharge patients from the hospital more quickly.  We 
examine whether or not those incentives spurred on changes in behaviour.   
However, we are not exclusively interested in examining whether higher hospital 
competition was associated with lower LOS.  Rather, we are interested in examining whether 
any changes we observe in LOS were driven by genuine improvements in hospital efficiency 
or instead were driven by hospitals selecting healthier patients for surgery or instead 
discharging patients ‘sicker and quicker’. Ultimately, a patient’s LOS is composed of two 
key components: 1) the time from the patient’s admission until their surgery; and 2) the time 
from the patient’s surgery until their discharge.  The pre-surgery LOS is largely determined 
by actions taken by the hospital and for elective hip-replacement, is likely largely unrelated 
to patient characteristics.  As a result, it should be a strong proxy for efficiency.  In contrast, 
the post-surgery LOS is heavily dependent on patient characteristics which directly influence 
recovery time (Epstein et al., 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996; Sudell et al., 1991). However, 
any significant decrease in post surgery LOS could also be a sign of hospitals choosing to 
operate on healthier patients, or hospitals taking steps to discharge patients before it was 
clinically appropriate.  Therefore, in this analysis, we examine whether the incentives created 
within the English NHS reforms created incentives that drove providers to quality skim in 
 2
order to garner additional revenue, or instead prompted providers to take concrete steps to 
become more efficient.   
Ultimately, we find that the NHS reforms prompted hospitals in the English NHS to 
become more efficient.  Our results suggest that after being exposed to incentives created by 
competition from 2006 onwards, hospitals have reacted by reducing their annual LOS. 
Crucially, we also find that while hospitals cut down on the pre-surgery component of LOS, 
there were no statistically significant differences in the time from surgery to discharge 
between competitive and non-competitive hospitals, suggesting that hospitals facing greater 
competition did not discharge patients ‘sicker and quicker’. We also found no evidence of 
hospitals choosing to operate on healthier or younger patients.  Thus, our results suggest that 
hospital competition in England within a market with fixed prices led to marked 
improvements in hospital efficiency as opposed to implementation of quicker, inappropriate 
discharge policies.  
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the NHS reforms.  Section 3 
provides a review of the relevant literature related to hospital competition and the impact of 
introducing fixed price payment systems.  Section 4 outlines our methodology and estimation 
strategy. Section 5 presents our results and section 6 includes our discussion and conclusion.   
 
 
2. The NHS Reforms 
 
The NHS reforms, introduced from 2002 onwards, involved significant changes to the way 
hospital care was paid for in England, gave patients a choice of their secondary health care 
providers, and diversified the supply of hospitals in the NHS (Department of Health, 2002).  
The reforms were all implemented on a rolling basis from 2002 onwards, and the key 
incentives from the reforms began significantly impacting providers from January 1st, 2006 
onwards. Figure 1 is a timeline of the major events in the rollout of the NHS reforms.   
In 2002, the Department of Health introduced Payment by Results (PbR), a new 
reimbursement system for financing hospital care in England (Department of Health, 2005c).  
The newly created system, which was fully operational for all elective care across England in 
2005, paid providers a fixed, pre-determined price for each episode of care they delivered.1  
This development brought financing of hospital care in England in line with the payment 
mechanisms used in most of Europe, Australia and the United States (Street and Maynard, 
2007).  
Prior to the introduction of PbR, hospitals in England were paid based using different 
forms of contracts, which varied in their degree of specificity and sophistication (Chalkley 
and Malcomson, 1998; Raftery et al., 1996).  In general, the contracts allowed regional 
bodies to a purchase a broad range of services from a particular provider with very little 
specificity on the volumes of activity or the case mix included in the agreement.  The new 
PbR system made two significant changes to how hospital care in England was funded.  First, 
it fixed prices nationally and precluded English hospitals from competing on prices.  Second, 
it allowed purchasers to pay for each unit of care, rather than for predefined volumes of 
                                                 
1 The PbR program was unveiled in 2002 and has been phased over time.  In 2003/2004, the program began by 
paying for elective activity that was necessary to shorten waiting times, but was not covered by existing 
contracts.  Initially, PbR only paid for care covered by 15 HRGs.  In 2004/2005, the program was expanded to 
pay for all elective care in Foundation Trust (FT) hospitals, which were a subset of high-performing NHS 
hospitals. In 2005/2006, the program was fully implemented across the NHS for elective care and HRGs were 
used to pay for nearly all elective hospital activity delivered to NHS patients treated in NHS and non-NHS 
hospitals.  From 2006 onwards, the system was expanded to pay for outpatient care and for non-elective 
inpatient hospital activity. 
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services that may or may not have been together (Department of Health, 2005c).  This shift in 
policy created strong incentives for hospitals to provide more care, rather than less.     
Under PbR, purchasers now pay for individual spells of activity that are defined from 
the time of a patient’s admission to the hospital until their discharge.  Prices for each episode 
for care were defined using Health Resource Groups (HRGs), which were modeled on 
diagnosis related groups (DRGs) from the US (Farrar et al., 2009)..  Right now, there are 
approximately 600 HRGs that account for the bulk of elective and non-elective hospital care 
and the prices for the HRGs are based on average national costs and are adjusted for local 
wage rates and input costs.  
At the same time as policy-makers introduced changes to how care was financed, the 
health service began paying for patients to receive care in private sector facilities in an effort 
to increase the range of choices available to NHS users (Department of Health, 2002).  
Beginning in 2003, the NHS helped coordinate and fund the development of Independent 
Sector Treatment Centers (ISTCs) which were structured to compete against traditional NHS 
hospitals and to provide elective surgery and diagnostic services.  Between 2002 and 2008, 
42 ISTCs opened across England and they are projected to eventually provide up to 15% of 
total elective care (Propper et al., 2006).  Also, in an effort to encourage local innovation, the 
government gave high performing hospitals additional fiscal, clinical and managerial 
autonomy.  Hospitals that earned additional autonomy were referred to as ‘foundation trusts’ 
(Department of Health, 2005a).   
Alongside diversifying the supply-side and introducing a fixed price, prospective 
payment system, policy-makers also gave patients a choice of where they went for secondary 
care.  Initially, the Government introduced pilot programs for patients waiting over six 
months of care for surgery.  After the success of the pilots, patient choice was extended and 
beginning in January 2006, every patient in England was to be offered a choice of at least 
four providers (of which one option should have been private) for care when they were 
referred for planned hospital care (Department of Health, 2002; Department of Health, 2003; 
Department of Health, 2008).    
Broadly, the reforms were supposed to create significant incentives for quality and 
efficiency in the NHS.  Policy-makers hoped that the new reimbursement system would 
increase activity rates, increase efficiency, as well as encourage providers to compete on 
quality.   As the reforms were being introduced, the central government paid particular 
attention to financial health of hospitals and providers were encouraged to generate annual 
surpluses, which they were able to reinvest into their facilities.  If hospitals ran deficits, they 
often received cautionary phone calls from the central government and in extreme situations, 
had their senior management removed.  This placed added pressure on providers to become 
more efficient. 
Crucially, we view January 2006 as our ‘policy-on’ date.  We view that as the key 
point when hospitals in England were exposed to the financial incentives created by patient 
choice, PbR and private sector providers who entered the market.  
 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
The new PbR system is a per case, prospective payment system that strongly resembles the 
US Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) introduced in 1983 (Frank and Lave, 1985; 
Lave and Frank, 1990; Manton et al., 1993).  Introducing prospective, fixed hospital 
reimbursement should clearly have a negative effect on patients’ LOS because a hospital’s 
net revenue per patient is decreased for each additional day of care they provide.  Under PbR, 
hospitals are paid a fixed amount based on the patient’s diagnosis, not on their actual cost of 
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treatment, so hospitals face the full cost each additional day that a patient remains 
hospitalized (Cutler, 1995).  Because the reimbursement costs in PbR are set at the national 
average, hospitals can maximize their revenue by reducing their LOS below national 
averages (Street and Maynard, 2007) 
There is an expansive literature from various countries suggesting that per case, 
prospective payment systems generally lead to a reduction in LOS.  In the US, several 
studies, including Feder et al. (1987), and Guterman and Dobson (1986) have found that the 
introduction of PPS in the US reduced LOS by between 3% and 10%.  Similarly, Feinglass 
and Holloway (1991) and Kahn et al. (1990) found that PPS led to a drop in LOS of over 
10%.   Such significant drops in LOS prompted fears that PPS may have also led to 
concurrent drops in clinical quality.  However, Cutler (1995) looked at outcomes for 67 
diagnoses and found that PPS did not lead to lower clinical quality.    
Evidence from the introduction of a new prospective hospital reimbursement in Israel 
in 1990 mirrored the experience observed in the US.  Looking at outcomes for five 
procedures, Shmueli et al. (2002) found that the new reimbursement system was associated 
with a significant reduction in LOS, but it did not lead to any statistically significant changes 
in mortality.  Likewise, after the Italian government introduced a DRG-based financing 
system in 1995, Louis et al. (1999) observed that LOS dropped, without having an adverse 
impact on mortality or readmission rates.  
There is also evidence from the impact of PbR in England. In a recent study, Farrar et 
al. (2009) conducted a difference-in-difference analysis comparing various outcomes 
measures in Scotland and England from 2002 through 2006.  Unlike England, Scotland did 
not introduce a prospective funding system from 2003 through 2006.  As a result, the authors 
were able to treat Scotland as a quasi-control and estimate the impact that PbR had on 
quality, volume and costs in the English NHS.  Farrar et al. (2009) found that in England, 
under a fixed price payment system, LOS fell more quickly and the proportion of day cases 
rose relative to Scotland.  Their work suggests that PbR was highly successful at reducing 
unit costs in the NHS and driving down LOS.  Echoing Cutler’s (1995) results, Farrar found 
no association between PbR and changes in mortality or readmission rates.  
While there is no empirical evidence available, there is reason to believe that hospitals 
facing greater competition will respond more aggressively to the introduction of a 
prospective payment system.  Fixed price, prospective payment systems like PbR in England 
create two sorts of incentives for providers.  First, because the marginal reimbursement rate 
for additional treatment is zero, there are strong incentives for providers to reduce LOS in 
order to maximize their revenue.  This type of incentive should apply to all hospitals, 
regardless of the degree of competition they are facing.  However, the second type of 
incentive created from PbR may have a more significant impact on hospitals located in less 
concentrated markets.   
Prospective, fixed price reimbursement systems pay hospitals for their activity and, 
assuming the reimbursement rate is greater than the marginal cost of care, PbR encourages 
providers to increase their activity in order to generate additional revenue.  However, 
hospitals located in monopoly markets likely have limited scope to expand their activity 
because they constrained by fixed levels of clinical demand within their catchment areas.  In 
contrast, for hospitals located in competitive markets where a hospital’s catchment area 
overlaps with other hospitals’ catchment areas, there are clear opportunities for hospitals to 
significantly expand their activity by poaching other hospitals’ patients.  To expand their 
activity, hospitals therefore will take action to reduce the time patients are in the hospital so 
they can have more room for additional patients.  
There is evidence that, with respect to clinical quality, hospitals located in less 
concentrated markets behave differently than hospitals located in monopoly markets when 
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they are exposed to competition (Cooper et al., 2010; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Propper 
et al., 2008).  Emerging research looking at the impact of fixed price competition on clinical 
quality in the US and England suggests that in a market with fixed prices, competition 
catalyzes improvements in clinical performance.  In a widely cited study examining the 
impact of market structure on quality, Kessler and McClellan (2000) looked at the impact of 
hospital competition in the US on AMI mortality for Medicare beneficiaries from 1985 to 
1994.  The authors simulate demand in order to create measures of competition that are not 
based on actual patient flows. They find that in the 1980s, the impact of competition was 
ambiguous, but in the 1990s, higher competition led to lower mortality.  Using related 
methodology, Kessler and Geppert (2005) found that competition was not only associated 
with improved outcomes in their Medicare population, but it also led to more intensive 
treatment for sicker patients, and less intense treatment for healthier patients who needed less 
care.  
In England, recent evidence examining the impact of the introduction of patient 
choice on clinical outcomes finds similar results.  Cooper et al. (2010) use a modified 
difference-in-difference analysis to analyze mortality from heart attacks and find that 
hospitals located in competitive markets improved their mortality more quickly than hospitals 
located in less competitive markets after patient choice and hospital competition was 
introduced nationally in 2006.  They find that from 2006 onwards, after the introduction of 
patient choice and hospital competition, mortality fell more quickly in hospitals facing 
greater competition.  In that study, the authors find that their results remain consistent across 
a number of different measures of market structure.   
This paper builds on this research and examines the impact of competition on hospital 
efficiency.  More specifically, the paper tests whether or not hospitals located in less 
concentrated markets reacted more aggressively to PbR when hospital competition was 
introduced in the English NHS in January 2006.  We test whether LOS was lower in hospitals 
facing greater competition after the introduction of a fixed price, prospective payment 
system.   We hypothesize that hospitals facing greater competition will take additional steps 
to shorten their LOS because they have the potential to increase their activity levels in order 
to garner additional revenue.  
 
 
4. Data, Measuring Competition and our Estimation Strategy 
 
Data and our measurement of efficiency 
This paper relies on patient-level Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) data from 2002 through 
2008 that are drawn from the NHS Commissioning Data Set. This is a large administrative 
data set, which records nearly every consultant episode.2  This dataset includes a wide range 
of information on patients, providers and local area characteristics.3   
Our analysis focuses on elective hip replacements with Office of Population, Census 
and Surveys Classification of Surgical Operations and Procedures 4th Edition (OPCS 4) codes 
of W37.1, W38.1 and W39.1.45  We focus on elective hip replacements in this study because 
it is a high volume surgical procedure where there is little variation in clinical practice 
(Hamilton and Bramley-Harker, 1999).  Further, while new clinical interventions in other 
specialties, like angioplasty for treating myocardial infarction, have become increasingly 
                                                 
2 Each HES record is a consultant episode, which we then collapsed to spells (admissions).   
3 Appendix 1 includes summary statistics for our sample.  
4 We did not include hip replacement revisions in our sample.  
5 Our analysis also integrates data on admissions for elective procedures (hip replacement, knee replacement, 
knee arthroscopy, cataract repair and hernia) for use in the construction of our competition indices. 
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more common in England over the last decade and have likely led to shorter lengths of stay 
and better outcomes, there has been very little change in how hip replacements are 
performed.  As a result, the changes we observe in the length of stay for hip replacement 
patients likely will be driven by the NHS reforms, not by other advancements in medical 
care.   
Our dependent variable of interest is hospitals’ annual, average length of stay for 
patients admitted for an elective hip replacement between 2002 and 2008.  Length of stay is 
measured as the time of a patient’s admission to the time of their discharge.  Our annual 
hospital-level LOS is the average LOS of all patients who underwent an elective hip 
replacement during the calendar year.  There has been significant attention focused on LOS 
in the literature because often, in the absence of strong cost data, it can serve as a strong 
proxy for efficiency (Fenn and Davies, 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996).  Ultimately, if quality 
can be maintained, a reduction in LOS will reduce the costs of carrying out a defined 
procedure.  Even though previous research illustrates that LOS is strongly influenced by 
patient characteristics, even after controlling for patient characteristics, there is significant 
evidence that illustrates that there is expansive, unexplained variations in LOS between 
hospitals (Martin and Smith, 1996).  
We believe that a key factor in successfully using LOS as a proxy for hospital 
efficiency is factoring out the influence of patient characteristics in how long a patient is in 
the hospital.  As a result, in order to get a stronger proxy for hospital efficiency, we divided 
patients’ length of stay in the hospital into two components.  The first component of LOS, 
which we refer to as the pre-surgery LOS, is measured as the time from when the patient was 
admitted for care until their elective surgery was performed.  For elective surgery, this 
component of LOS is likely not highly influenced by patient characteristics and should be 
highly influenced by hospital behavior.  The second component of LOS that we measure is 
the post-surgery LOS, which is recorded as time from the surgery itself until a patient’s 
discharge.  Clearly, the literature suggests that this component of LOS should be heavily 
influenced by patient characteristics (Epstein et al., 1990; Martin and Smith, 1996; Sudell et 
al., 1991).   
For our empirical analysis, we log transformed our various measures of LOS because 
they approximated log-normal distributions and because we expected the changes in length of 
stay to occur proportionately, rather than linearly.  We limited our observations to patients 
ranging in age from 55 to 90 and we excluded observations where the LOS was in the highest 
1% of our distribution. 
At the hospital level, we know hospital site postcodes, and the NHS Trust to which 
the site belongs and have information on providers’ annual activity levels.  In addition, we 
are able to control for hospitals’ annual 30-day mortality and readmission rates.  Within this 
study, we use 30-day mortality in the community where deaths data are drawn from the 
Office of National Statistics (ONS).  Most existing research on the NHS is at the hospital 
Trust level and typically uses the address of the Trust headquarters to define the location 
where patients received care.  This is a very approximate basis for locating hospitals and 
constructing spatial competition variables.  In practice, NHS trusts are usually composed of 
multiple smaller sites, which are sometimes separated by distances of up to 50km, and Trust 
headquarters are often not located where the Trust actually carries out clinical care. Trust-
based competition indices thus miss out on important dimensions of inter-site competition 
both between and within Trusts.  We are able to improve on this by using postcodes of the 
hospital site where the patient receives their treatment.6  
                                                 
6 Site postcodes are missing in our data for up to 15% of the patient observations, but most of these cases with 
missing site codes come from patients treated at trusts that only actually had one site.  For observations where 
the site postcode was missing and the Trust only had one site, we replace the missing site postcode with the 
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We use GP and hospital site postcodes to calculate distances between a patient's GP 
and the hospital where their secondary care was delivered.  This distance is an important 
component in our analysis and is used as an input into our competition measures. For our 
main analysis, we use matrices of straight-line distances. We generated the GP-hospital 
origin-destination matrix using the Network Analysis tools from ArcGIS.  
Our patient level data allow us to effectively risk-adjust for clinical severity by 
controlling for patient characteristics in our estimates. These patient characteristics include 
gender, age and Charlson comorbidity score (Charlson et al., 1978).  We carry out our 
analysis at the hospital level, and control for annual changes in patient characteristics at 
individual hospital sites.  The data suppliers use the patients’ home address to link to 
residential area characteristics like urban density and socio-economic status. Socio-economic 
status is measured at the Census Output Area Level using the income vector of the 2007 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (Communities and Local Government Department, 2009). For 
confidentiality reasons, the patient home addresses are not available for use in our analysis. 
However, we do have access to codes that identify the patient's GP and GP postcode. There 
are around 7600-7700 GP postcodes in each year in our data. Patients can usually (at the time 
relevant for our study) only register at a GP practice if they live in a GP’s catchment area, so 
a patient’s GP practice location serves as a strong proxy for a patient’s home addresses. 
 
Estimating competition 
There is significant debate and discussion about how to measure hospital competition (Baker, 
2001).  Often the debate about how to measure competition centers on two key concerns: 
how to specifically quantify competition (which index to use) and how to define the market 
within which hospitals compete (Baker, 2001; Kessler and McClellan, 2000).  The 
overarching concern when measuring hospital competition, particularly when it is going to be 
used to examine the relationship between competition and quality or competition and 
efficiency is the potential for endogeneity (Kessler and McClellan, 2000).  Here, there is a 
risk that when competition is measured using actual patient flows, there may be a two-way 
relationship between competition and efficiency.  For example, a high performing hospital 
may appear to be operating in a less competitive market because it has been able to attract 
market-share from its competitors or even drive them out of the market.  Likewise, poorly 
performing providers may appear to be operating in more competitive markets because their 
lack of quality and efficiency has encouraged other competitors to enter the market and offer 
better services to patients at more reasonable prices.  In what follows, we will outline how we 
estimate competition in this paper and discus the steps we take to mitigate against 
endogeneity between competition and efficiency.  
When measuring competition, investigators often use a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) to describe and quantify the underlying market structure. The traditional HHI is 
defined as the sum of the squares of the market share of providers within a defined market, 
such that: 
 
(1)     hhi = si2
i=1
N∑ , 
 
where si is the market share of firm i in a market with N firms.  The advantage of using an 
HHI to quantify competition is that it takes into account both the number of firms in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Trust postcode.  For the fewer than 2% of observations where there was a missing site postcode for a patient 
treated at a Trust with more than one site, we randomly assigned patients to sites within that Trust. 
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market and the relative size of the firms.  However, there are fears that using an HHI 
introduces the possibility of endogeneity because if a firm in the market has very high quality 
or efficiency, it will also likely have a significant market-share.  That itself will make the 
market look less competitive.  To avoid this potential endogeneity, researchers often simply 
use the count of firms within the market to quantify competition.  Within this paper, we use 
both counts and HHIs to measure competition and show that our results are robust across 
both measures.   
In practice, within our estimators, we use the negative natural logarithm of an HHI 
based on hospitals’ patient shares, where:  
 
(2)     nlhhij = − ln
nk
N j
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
k=1
N∑ . 
 
Here, nk is the number of procedures carried out at hospital site k within market area j and Nj 
is the total number of procedures carried out in market area j. This negative log 
transformation of the HHI is convenient because it increases with competition, with zero 
corresponding to monopoly and infinity to perfect competition.  In addition, this estimation 
of the HHI is convenient because the negative natural log of the HHI is equal to the natural 
log of the number of equal sized providers in the market.  That is,  
 
(3)  
nlhhij = − ln(hhij ) = ln 1hhij
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= ln(equivalent number equal sized providers)
. 
 
So, for instance, our average HHI in our preferred estimation is 0 .79, which is equivalent to 
approximately 2 equal size providers in a patient’s geographic market.  
Once investigators decide how to measure competition within markets, the more 
pressing question is how to define the market areas in which hospitals compete.  There are 
three often-used strategies to define the market over which hospitals compete, each with their 
respective strengths and weaknesses.  First, researchers can use administrative boundaries to 
delineate their market boundaries.  In England, in particular, this strategy is not appropriate 
because patients can travel outside of their administrative boundaries for care.  A second 
strategy is for investigators define the market using a fixed radius drawn around a firm and 
then treat any firms which are located within that fixed radius market as a competitor. The 
advantage of a fixed radius market definition is that it is easy to compute.  The down size is 
that it leads to significant urban rural bias and likely over-estimates competition in urban 
areas and under-estimates competition in rural areas.  A third strategy often used in the 
literature is to quantify competition using a variable radius market.  Here, the radius 
corresponds to a length that captures a fixed percentage of a hospital’s patients.  So, for 
instance, a hospital’s market could be defined by a radius that captures 80% of a the 
hospital’s patients.  The advantage of using a variable radius definition of market size is that 
it is sensitive to urban rural differences.  The central drawback of the variable radius measure 
is that it maybe potentially endogenous to quality.  For example, a high quality hospital may 
draw patients from a greater distance than a low quality substitute. As a result, using a 
variable radius measure to define the hospital’s size could lead to a correlation with the 
hospital’s quality or efficiency. 
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In this paper, we define markets using a variable radius, but we make several key 
modifications aimed at thwarting endogeneity.  First, we use a difference-in-difference 
estimator to assess the relationship between competition and quality. As we will discuss in 
the next section, this reduces the risk of endogeneity because we were not interested in the 
cross-sectional relationship between LOS and market structure, but rather we examine the 
interaction of time and market structure on LOS.  Second, rather than centering our markets 
on hospitals, we center them on GP practices (which is where the choice of provider gets 
made).  Third, we use a time-fixed competition measure and estimate competition and radius 
size from 2002 through 2005, before patient choice and hospital competition were formally 
introduced.  As a result, the size of our market area is determined mainly by historical 
precedence and not heavily influenced by clinical performance or patient choices.  Fourth, we 
calculate our competition measures as a composite of the competition measures for several 
surgical procedures.  Fifth, we aggregate our GP-level competition measures up to the 
hospital level, so that a hospital’s calculated competition is the average of the competition 
measured in the GPs’ markets that refer to a particular hospital.  
Details on our methodology for constructing our market definitions are as follows. 
Consider an elective procedure, e.g. hip replacements, in one year, e.g. 2002. We first use 
matrices of patient flows from GPs to hospitals for hip replacement in 2002 to deduce GP 
centered market areas. Specifically, we find the radius that represents the 95th percentile of 
distance traveled from a GP to hospitals for hip replacements in 2002. This radius defines the 
limit of the feasible choice set for patients at this GP in 2002. Note, only one patient needs to 
attend a hospital site for that site to modify the GP-centered market radius. We then compute 
a nlhhi based on all hospitals providing hip replacements within this GP’s market area, 
regardless of whether this GP actually refers patients to all of these hospitals. This process is 
repeated for all GPs, all years 2002-2005 and all five key elective procedures – arthroscopy 
cataract repair, hernia repair, hip replacement, and knee replacement. A single elective nlhhi 
is calculated for each GP and year as a weighted average of the procedure-specific nlhhi, 
where the weights are proportional to the volume of patients in each procedure category.  
This pre-reform competition is then collapsed into a single, time fixed measure and 
aggregated up to the hospital-level.  Thus, each hospital is assigned a nlhhi that is then the 
average of the level of competition in each GPs market who refers to that hospital.   
In addition, we also calculate a measure of primary school competition in an identical 
manner, which we use in a placebo test later in the paper. 
 
Estimation strategy 
In our analysis, we rely on two DiD estimators to test whether hospitals located in less 
concentrated markets were able to increase their efficiency after they were exposed to 
hospital competition from January 1, 2006 onwards. Whereas the bulk of the existing 
research on hospital competition relies on analyzing a cross sectional relationship between 
measured competition and quality, we use our estimates of competition to determine which 
hospital markets were ‘treated’ and therefore exposed to the full force of the NHS market-
based reforms after they took effect in 2006.  This is a further step to thwart endogeneity 
between our competition measures and LOS.  Similar DiD estimation strategies have been 
used in other contexts, for example, in the evaluation of the employment effects of the 
minimum wage (Card, 1992), as well as to study the earlier 1990s internal market NHS 
reforms (Propper et al., 2008). 
In our first estimator, we use a traditional DiD framework with a binary post-
treatment (post 2005) indicator variable interacted with a continuous treatment variable (our 
competition measure).  In practice, this takes the form: 
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(4) 
 
LOS jt =α +β1nlhhij + β2 Post j + β3(Post j *nlhhij )+ ′γ controlsijkt + errorijkt . 
 
Here, the Post variable is equal to 1 if the year is 2006 or later and nHHIi is our measure of 
market-concentration.  In (4), we are interested in the coefficient associated with β3, which is 
the interaction of Post and nlhhi and illustrates the impact of higher competition after the 
reforms were put in place.  Within (4), we include hospital fixed effects and also control for a 
range of controls including hospitals’ annual activity levels, their annual gender composition, 
the annual average of the Charlson co-morbidity score of their patients, the average annual 
age of their patients, the average annual socio-economic status of their patients, and the 
hospital’s annual 30-day mortality7 and readmission rates. 
In addition to (4), we also use a modified DiD estimator where our nlhhi is interacted 
with year dummies.  This framework allows us to get a more nuanced picture of the changes 
induced in LOS and the year-on-year impact of competition on LOS that illustrate more 
precisely when there was a time break in the LOS trends.  Using our modified DiD 
framework, our estimation takes the form:  
 
(5)    
 
LOS jt = α +β1t+β2nlHHI j + β3(nlHHI j * 2003)+ β4(nlHHI j * 2004)+ β5(nlHHI j* 2005)...
+ β8(nlHHI6 * 2008) + ′γ controlsijkt + errorijkt
 
 
Here, coefficient β1 captures year dummies for 2003 – 2008. Coefficient β2 captures 
the nlhhi for hospital j and β3 , β4, β5 , β6, β7 , β8 are similar to the interaction term in a 
traditional DiD estimator and capture the impact of competition on LOS in 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008.  The coefficient β2 is informative in that it provides the basis for the 
test of whether or not there are pre-policy differences in LOS for hospitals located in high 
versus low concentration markets.  The existence of pre-policy differences in LOS would 
undermine the credibility of our DiD strategy.  The controls included in (5) were hospitals’ 
annual average age of patients, their gender distribution, their patients’ average socio-
economic status, and their average co-morbidity.  In addition, we included hospital fixed 
effects as well as controls for hospitals’ annual activity levels, 30-day mortality8 for hip 
replacements and thirty-day readmission rates for hip replacements.   
 
Instrumental variable estimation 
In addition to using HHIs and counts to quantify competition, we also use an instrumented 
measure of competition.  Recall that two main causes for concern related to endogeneity are: 
a) the nlhhi in (4) and (5) is potentially endogenous to LOS in each hospital market because 
of the dependence of the market radius and hospital shares on LOS; and b) that the 
coefficients on the interaction between competition and time that we use in our estimator may 
pick up basic urban-rural differences that specifically related to hospital competition 
differences. 
To address these issues, we provide IV estimates using an instrument for competition 
based on variation in distances from a patient’s GP to the four nearest hospitals.  These GP-
based measures are then aggregated up to each hospital. We view variation in the GP-to-
hospital distances as an exogenous measure of completion because if a patient is registered at 
a GP where there is a high variance in the distance to local hospitals, each substitution from 
one hospital to another will have high transportation costs for the patient.  This makes the 
                                                 
7 Our 30-day mortality for hip replacement included deaths outside of the hospital.  
8 Our 30-day mortality for hip replacement included deaths outside of the hospital.  
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patient less likely to exercise choice and as a result, creates less competitive pressure on local 
hospitals.   For example, we assume patients registered at a GP with its four nearest hospitals 
located at 1km, 12km, 27 km and 31km away from the GP will have a stronger pull to their 
nearest hospital than a patient whose GP was located 12km, 15km 17km, and 17km from its 
four nearest hospitals, despite the fact that the average distance to the nearest four providers 
is the same in both cases.   Aggregated up to the hospital level, a hospital whose catchment 
area has significant variation in the distances the patients have to travel to get care will likely 
face less competition than a hospital in a market where patients have clear substitutes for care 
and little variation in the distance they need to travel. 
We therefore use the variation in GP-site distance (amongst the nearest four sites) 
aggregated to the hospital level, as an instrument for nlhhi, conditional on the mean distance 
to hospitals.  The idea here is similar to that of predicting hospital shares from exogenous 
variables implemented in Kessler and McClellan (2000). However, we implement a more 
traditional IV, avoiding their non-linear 1st stage prediction and predicting competition from 
implicit travel costs, not patient demographics.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
Our analysis was conducted on 290,854 elective hip replacements, performed on NHS 
patients age 55 through 90, from 2002 to 2008.  During this period, the procedures were 
performed at 277 unique site locations for patients who were registered at 8126 GP practices 
across England.  In our analysis, efficiency is measured by a patient’s length of stay in the 
hospital for elective hip replacement.  As we have discussed, we separated length of stay into 
two components.  The first component of length of stay is measured from the time of a 
patient’s admission until their surgery.  The second component is measured from their 
surgery until their discharge.  During this period, patients were in the hospital for an average 
of 7.9 days for a hip replacement of which 92% of time spent in the hospital during the 
admission occurred after the patients’ surgery was performed. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in overall, pre- and post- LOS from 2002 through 
2008.  Overall LOS and post-surgery LOS fell steadily during this time period, though the 
rate of decline begins to slow in 2007.  This is consistent with previous research, which has 
found that the introduction of PbR led to shorter waiting times in England in comparison with 
Scotland (Farrar et al., 2009).  In contrast, pre-surgical LOS hovers at approximately 1 day 
from 2002 through 2005, but begins to fall from 2006 onwards.  Each year, there is 
significant variation in pre-surgery, overall and post-surgery LOS between hospitals 
suggesting that there is scope for underperforming hospitals to increase their efficiency.   
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the changes in overall, pre-surgery and post-surgery LOS for 
hospitals located in the most competitive, somewhat competitive, and least competitive 
markets.  As figures 3 and 5 illustrate, the degree of competition in the hospital market had 
little bearing on its overall or post-surgical LOS.  There is a uniform decrease in overall and 
post-surgical LOS regardless of the underlying hospital market structure. However, as figure 
4 illustrates, market structure appears to have a significant effect on the pre-surgery LOS.  
Pre-surgical LOS in hospitals facing the most significant competition drops at a significantly 
faster rate than it does in hospitals located in somewhat and less competitive markets.  In 
addition, there is a significant increase in the rate of decrease from 2006 onwards, after 
hospitals in England were exposed to hospital competition. 
Table 1 presents the least-squared estimates of (4), which is our traditional DiD 
estimator.  This specifications includes controls for patient characteristics, hospital fixed 
effects and annual hospital 30-day mortality and readmission rates.  Here, the interaction 
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term illustrates that from January 2006 onwards (our post reform period), higher competition 
was associated with lower overall LOS.  Table 2 presents least-squared estimates of (4) 
where LOS is broken down into its two key components: pre-surgery and post-surgery LOS.  
Results from Table 2 illustrate that it is likely changes in pre-surgery LOS which are driving 
the reductions we observe in overall LOS.  In Table 2, the interaction between competition, 
measured as the nlhhi, and the post reform dummy is only significant for the pre-surgery 
LOS.  The interaction term associated with post-surgery LOS is negative, but not significant.  
Table 3 presents the least-squared estimates of (5) where competition is measured 
using our variable radius HHI.9   This is our preferred specification of (5) and includes 
controls for patient characteristics, hospital fixed effects, as well as hospital 30-day 
readmission rates and 30-day mortality rates.  The year point estimates from Column (1), (2) 
and (3), mirror our findings in Figure 2 and echo results from Table 1.  Pre-surgery LOS 
declined from 2006 onwards and overall LOS and post-surgery LOS fell steadily over the 
entire period.  Crucially, our estimates presented in Column 1 in Table 3 suggests that after 
hospitals were exposed to competition in January 2006, hospitals located in less concentrated 
markets had shorter pre-surgery LOS than hospitals located in more concentrated markets.  
These decreases hospitals located in less concentrated markets made in pre-surgery LOS 
translated into decreases in overall LOS that were statistically significant in 2006.    
Interestingly, at the same time as hospitals facing greater competition took steps to shorten 
their pre-surgery LOS, there were no statistically significant reductions in post-surgery LOS 
suggesting that hospitals facing added competition did not discharge patients sicker and 
quicker.  In addition, there was no significant association between the competition * year 
interactions and pre-surgery, overall or post-surgery LOS prior to 2006. 
It is also worthwhile to note that the coefficients on baseline competition measure 
were not significant in any of our estimates.  This illustrates that there was not a differences 
in pre-surgery, overall or post-surgery LOS between hospitals located in concentrated versus 
non-concentrated markets.  This validates the assumptions underpinning our DiD estimator.   
Table 4 presents least-squared estimates of (5) where competition is measured as the 
count of hospitals located within a variable radius market.  Recall that this market-measure 
does not take into account the relative size of hospitals within the markets.  In this estimation, 
our use of hospital counts serves as a robustness check on our use of an HHI to quantify 
market concentration.  The results in Table 4 echo the results we observe in Table 3.  We find 
that overall and post-surgery LOS decline steadily from 2002 though 2008. In addition, we 
find that hospitals located in less concentrated markets had lower pre-surgery LOS than 
hospitals located in more concentrated markets after hospitals were exposed to the incentives 
created by PbR and competition in 2006.  At the same time, there were no significant 
differences in post-surgery LOS that were driven by differences in market structure.  We find 
a less strong association between competition and overall LOS than we observed when 
market concentration was quantified using an HHI, though this likely is driven by the fact 
that pre-surgery LOS accounts for such a small percentage of overall LOS.     
Table 5 presents our placebo test with estimates of (5) where competition is measured 
as the market structure within primary schools in England.  The placebo test serves to 
validate that our estimates of hospital competition are not simply picking up spurious 
associations with urban density, which would also be captured in our school competition 
estimates.  When we estimate (5) substituting school competition for hospital competition, 
we find no significant associations between our nlhhi * year interactions and pre-surgery, 
overall or post-surgery LOS.  
                                                 
9 Appendix 2 presents the fully expanded results for Table 3.  
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Table 6 presents estimates of (5) where patient characteristics are substituted for LOS 
and serve as the dependent variables.  These estimates represent a test of whether the results 
we capture in Table 3 and Table 4 are driven by changes in hospital efficiency, or instead 
reflected hospitals actively cream-skimming, or other broad changes in hospitals’ patient case 
mix.  Crucially, there were no significant associations between market-structure and patient 
morbidity (measured using the Charlson index of co-morbidity), age or the income vector of 
the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations.  Estimates from Column (1), (2) and (3) from Table 
6 illustrate that any changes in pre-surgery and overall LOS likely were not driven by 
hospitals operating on healthier, wealthier or younger patients. Interesting, in 2006, after the 
introduction of competition, hospitals located in less concentrated markets appeared to attract 
patients from higher socio-economic groups and the coefficient associated with the 
interaction between our 2006 year dummy and competition is nearly significant (p = 0.05).  
Given that there were no concurrent changes in age or co-morbidity, this likely did not 
influence our results.  However, since 2006 was the first year of formal choice, this 
coefficient may be capturing the a greater proclivity among the middle and upper class to 
exercise ‘choice’ and travel further for care.  
 
Instrumental variable estimation results 
Table 7 presents our instrumental variables estimates of (5).  Here, we instrument for market-
structure using the variation in the straight line distance from each GP to the nearest four 
hospitals who perform hip replacements and aggregate up to the hospital level.  The F-Tests 
on our instruments are significant (p < 0.0001).10  The results for our IV estimates of (5) 
presented in Table 7 are similar to the results we obtained in our preferred specification 
presented in Table 3.  The IV estimates in Table 7 demonstrate that from 2006 onwards, after 
hospitals were exposed to competition, hospitals located in less concentrated markets shorted 
their pre-surgery LOS more than hospitals located in more concentrated markets.  At the 
same time, there was no statistically significant difference in post-surgery LOS that was 
driven by differences in hospitals’ underlying market structure.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients in our IV estimates are nearly double those presented in our preferred 
specification (Table 7 versus Table 3), although a Hausman test indicates that there is no 
statistically significant differences between the IV and OLS coefficients.  As such, there is no 
evidence from the IV estimates presented in Table 7 that it is endogeneity between market 
structure and LOS that is driving our central findings.  
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The main thrust of English health policy over the last five years has focused on increasing 
patient choice and hospital competition within a market with fixed prices. These market-
based reforms within the English NHS have prompted significant academic and ideological 
debate (Dixon, 2009; Hunter, 2009; Le Grand, 2009).  Previous research has found that these 
reforms led to higher clinical quality (lower mortality from acute myocardial infarctions) 
(Cooper et al., 2010).  This paper uses a modified difference-in-difference estimator to 
examine whether or not hospital competition led to improvements in efficiency, which we 
proxy using patients’ pre-surgery LOS for elective hip replacement.  
There is ample reason to believe that competition will create incentives for hospitals 
to become more efficient.  In England, the newly introduced fixed-price reimbursement 
                                                 
10 The F-statistics on our IV estimates of (4) with pre-surgery LOS serving as the dependent variable are 
62,732.75, 50131.67, 62547.78, 2318.92, 1346.70, and 44303.90, 6022.63 respectively.  
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system rewards hospitals for increasing their activity.  In markets where hospitals are not 
constrained by fixed levels of clinical demand and have the potential to increase their 
activity, competition likely will spur hospitals to reduce their LOS in order to allow them to 
operate on more patients.  
In testing this hypothesis we find that after hospitals were exposed to competition in 
2006, hospitals which were located in less concentrated (more competitive markets) 
shortened their pre-surgery LOS more than hospitals located in concentrated markets.  In 
addition, there were no differences in post-surgery LOS that were driven by market-structure 
and nor was their any evidence of cream-skimming.  Therefore, our results suggest that after 
being exposed to competition, hospitals located in competitive markets took steps to improve 
their efficiency without compromising patient care or avoiding treating high-risk patients.  
These findings are consistent with previous research which has highlighted that during this 
period, hospitals located in more competitive markets had better hospital management 
(Bloom et al., 2010).   
More broadly, this research illustrates that firms’ underlying market-structure 
influences their reaction to changes in payment systems.  Previous empirical research has 
found that a shift to prospective, fixed priced payments systems has led to a reduction in 
LOS.  We have found that have found that firms located in more competitive markets react 
even more strongly to fixed price reimbursement systems because they have the additional 
opportunity to expand their market-share and increase their activity, which in the long term, 
will lead to higher revenue. 
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Table 1: Least squared estimate of (4) 
where dependent variable is hospitals’ 
overall LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Post -0.1764*** 
(0.0178) 
nlhhi 0.0269 
(0.1305) 
Post * nlhhi -0.0486* 
(0.0231) 
  
Hospital Fixed 
Effects 
Yes 
  
R2 0.69 
Obs 1518 
  
Patient characteristics: average annual 
patient age; average annual patient 
socioeconomic status measured using the 
income component of the 2007 Index of 
Multiple Deprivations; patient gender; and 
average annual patient Charlson 
comorbidity score. 
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of 
procedures carried out at each hospital 
annually; annual hospital 30-day hip 
replacement mortality; and annual hospital 
30-day readmission rate. 
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital 
sites. 
 
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 
1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Table 2: Least squared estimate of (4) where dependent 
variable is overall length of stay where the dependent 
variable is hospitals’ average pre- and post-surgery LOS 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-surgery 
LOS
Post-Surgery 
LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard 
Error) 
Post -0.1228*** 
(0.0312) 
-0.1596*** 
(0.0236) 
nlhhi -0.2107 
(0.2251) 
0.2725 
(0.2749) 
Post * nlhhi -0.0762* 
(0.0355) 
-0.0360 
(0.0285) 
   
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
R2 0.64 0.69 
Obs 1518 1518 
   
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average 
annual patient socioeconomic status measured using the income 
component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; patient 
gender; and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at 
each hospital annually; annual hospital 30-day hip replacement 
mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
 
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant 
at 0.1% 
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Table 3: Least squared estimates of (5), where competition is measured as the negative 
natural log of the HHI within a variable radius market  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Pre-Surgery LOS Overall LOS Post-Surgery LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
2003 * nlhhi -0.0273 
(0.0191) 
-0.0162 
(0.0155) 
-0.0131 
(0.0196) 
2004 * nlhhi -0.0379 
(0.0281) 
-0.0210 
(0.0222) 
-0.0088 
(0.0278) 
2005 * nlhhi -0.0681 
(0.0402) 
-0.0385 
(0.213) 
-0.0202 
(0.0289) 
2006 * nlhhi -0.1024* 
(0.0413) 
-0.0777* 
(0.0256) 
-0.0571 
(0.0290) 
2007 * nlhhi -0.1195* 
(0.0479) 
-0.0762** 
(0.0281) 
-0.0551 
(0.0305) 
2008 * nlhhi -0.1037* 
(0.0518) 
-0.0474 
(0.0351) 
-0.0276 
(0.0453) 
    
2003 0.0126 
(0.0147) 
-0.0460** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0511** 
(0.0155) 
2004 -0.0031 
(0.0227) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.1072*** 
(0.0209) 
2005 0.0170 
(0.0334) 
-0.1544*** 
(0.0200) 
-0.1900*** 
(0.0289) 
2006  -0.0350 
(0.0346) 
-0.1930*** 
(0.0213) 
-0.2074*** 
(0.0240) 
2007 -0.1270* 
(0.0416) 
-0.2670*** 
(0.0247) 
-0.2640*** 
(0.0288) 
2008 -0.2269*** 
(0.0476) 
-0.3540*** 
(0.0283) 
-0.3280*** 
(0.0388) 
    
nlhhi -0.1165 
(0.2184) 
0.1137 
(0.1123) 
0.3413 
(0.2498) 
    
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1518 1518 1526 
R2 0.69 0.80 0.75 
    
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic 
status measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; 
patient gender; and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually; annual 
hospital 30-day hip replacement mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Table 4: Least squared estimates of (5), where competition is measured as the count of 
hospitals within a variable radius market  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Pre-Surgery LOS Overall LOS Post-Surgery LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
2003 * Count -0.0037 
(0.0020) 
-0.0016 
(0.0018) 
-0.0010 
(0.0024) 
2004 * Count -0.0013 
(0.0028) 
-0.0016 
(0.0023) 
-0.0016 
(0.0028) 
2005 * Count -0.0074 
(0.0043) 
-0.0037 
(0.0022) 
-0.0018 
(0.0031) 
2006 * Count -0.0103* 
(0.0045) 
-0.0067* 
(0.0027) 
-0.0049 
(0.0031) 
2007 * Count -0.0125* 
(0.0052) 
-0.0052 
(0.0028) 
-0.0032 
(0.0033) 
2008 * Count -0.0136* 
(0.0054) 
-0.0043 
(0.0039) 
-0.0008 
(0.0050) 
    
2003 0.0136 
(0.0128) 
-0.0488*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0541*** 
(0.0149) 
2004 -0.0262 
(0.0204) 
-0.1032*** 
(0.0150) 
-0.1025*** 
(0.0194) 
2005 0.0075 
(0.0290) 
-0.1618*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.1940*** 
(0.0252) 
2006  -0.0524 
(0.0298) 
-0.2138*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.2230*** 
(0.0210) 
2007 -0.1439*** 
(0.0360) 
-0.2956*** 
(0.0223) 
-0.2901*** 
(0.0246) 
2008 -0.2263 
(0.0403)*** 
-0.3657*** 
(0.0246) 
-0.3445*** 
(0.0315) 
    
Count -0.0137 
(0.0294) 
0.0161 
(0.0120) 
0.0488 
(0.0286) 
    
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1518 1518 1518 
R2 0.69 0.80 0.69 
    
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic status 
measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; patient gender; 
and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually; annual hospital 
30-day hip replacement mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Table 5: Placebo test.  Least squared estimates of (5), where competition is measured as 
the nlhhi of primary schools within a variable radius market  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Pre-Surgery LOS Overall LOS Post-Surgery LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
2003 * nlhhi_school -0.0008 
(0.0097) 
-0.0060 
(0.0071) 
-0.0092 
(0.0095) 
2004 * nlhhi_school 0.0039 
(0.0142) 
-0.0037 
(0.0094) 
-0.0022 
(0.0121) 
2005 * nlhhi_school -0.0125 
(0.0204) 
-0.0139 
(0.0115) 
-0.0069 
(0.0192) 
2006 * nlhhi_school -0.0091 
(0.0217) 
-0.0139 
(0.0139) 
-0.0118 
(0.0143) 
2007 * nlhhi_school 0.0079 
(0.0253) 
-0.0006 
(0.0140) 
-0.0036 
(0.0142) 
2008 * nlhhi_school -0.0070 
(0.0285) 
-0.0271 
(0.0306) 
-0.0279 
(0.0347) 
    
2003 -0.0046 
(0.0335) 
-0.0344 
(0.0271) 
-0.0263 
(0.0344) 
2004 -0.0469 
(0.0520) 
-0.0963** 
(0.0367) 
-0.1045* 
(0.0420) 
2005 0.0122 
(0.0765) 
-0.1289** 
(0.0436) 
-0.1791* 
(0.0737) 
2006  -0.0770 
(0.0810) 
-0.1967*** 
(0.0532) 
-0.2082*** 
(0.0532) 
2007 -0.2486** 
(0.0951) 
-0.3219*** 
(0.0544) 
-0.2949*** 
(0.0546) 
2008 -0.2811 
(0.1082)* 
-0.2831** 
(0.1046) 
-0.2411* 
(0.1204) 
    
nlhhi_school  
-0.0661 
-0.0638 
(0.0751) 
0.0331 
(0.1101) 
    
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1518 1518 1518 
R2 0.68 0.80 0.74 
    
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic status 
measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; patient gender; 
and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually; annual hospital 
30-day hip replacement mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Table 6: Estimates of (5) with patient characteristics serving as the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Charlson Co-Morbidity 
Score 
Age IMD 2007 Income 
Component 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
2003 * nlhhi -0.0289 
(0.0232) 
0.0143 
(0.2625) 
-0.0502 
(0.0415) 
2004 * nlhhi -0.0288 
(0.0441) 
-0.0223 
(0.2545) 
-0.0193 
(0.0533) 
2005 * nlhhi -0.0128 
(0.0368) 
0.1842 
(0.2766) 
-0.0617 
(0.0477) 
2006 * nlhhi 0.0175 
(0.0481) 
0.0686 
(0.3161) 
-0.1003 
(0.0509) 
2007 * nlhhi -0.0412 
(0.0379) 
-0.2594 
(0.2901) 
-0.0321 
(0.0504) 
2008 * nlhhi -0.0428 
(0.0395) 
0.4748 
(0.2758) 
-0.1028 
(0.0605) 
    
2003 0.0490* 
(0.0233) 
0.1921 
(0.2009) 
0.0030 
(0.0321) 
2004 0.0753 
(0.0435) 
0.2924 
(0.1957) 
-0.0563 
(0.0465) 
2005 0.0840** 
(0.0259) 
0.2535 
(0.2194) 
-0.0204 
(0.0389) 
2006  0.0523 
(0.0418) 
0.4380 
(0.2514) 
-0.0038 
(0.0444) 
2007 0.1570*** 
(0.0307) 
0.8167** 
(0.2729) 
-0.0893 
(0.0521) 
2008 0.2104*** 
(0.0326) 
0.5436* 
(0.2613) 
-0.0523 
(0.0537) 
    
nlhhi -0.0973 
(0.2175) 
-2.4275 
(1.5383) 
0.2961 
(0.03395) 
    
Hospital Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1518 1518 1518 
R2 0.57 0.61 0.91 
    
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic status 
measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; patient gender; 
and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
 
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Table 7: IV estimates of (5)   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Pre-Surgery LOS Overall LOS Post-Surgery LOS 
 Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
2003 * IV_nlhhi -0.0341 
(0.0444) 
-0.0422 
(0.0359) 
-0.0682 
(0.0532) 
2004 * IV_nlhhi -0.0858 
(0.0460) 
-0.0060 
(0.0306) 
0.0191 
(0.0436) 
2005 * IV_nlhhi -0.1165 
(0.0755) 
-0.0196 
(0.0488) 
0.0026 
(0.0757) 
2006 * IV_nlhhi -0.1521 
(0.0777) 
-0.0532 
(0.0655) 
-0.0125 
(0.0825) 
2007 * IV_nlhhi -0.1965* 
(0.0904) 
-0.0757 
(0.0693) 
-0.0385 
(0.0846) 
2008 * IV_nlhhi -0.2011* 
(0.0993) 
-0.1071 
(0.0729) 
-0.0846 
(0.0945) 
    
2003 0.0188 
(0.0329) 
-0.0255 
(0.0264) 
-0.0088 
(0.0412) 
2004 0.0382 
(0.0362) 
-0.1110*** 
(0.0278) 
-0.1357 
(0.0345) 
2005 0.0582 
(0.0588) 
-0.1727*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.2147 
(0.0598) 
2006  0.0056 
(0.0625) 
-0.2128*** 
(0.0573) 
-0.2448 
(0.0691) 
2007 -0.0660 
(0.0731) 
-0.2682*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.2781 
(0.0689) 
2008 -0.1427 
(0.0815) 
-0.3137*** 
(0.0678) 
-0.2973 
(0.0826) 
    
IV_nlhhi -0.5529 
(1.0543) 
0.6090 
(0.7788) 
1.3625 
(0.9719) 
    
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1518 1518 1518 
R2 0.67 0.78 0.70 
    
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic 
status measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; 
patient gender; and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually; annual 
hospital 30-day hip replacement mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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Figure 1: A timeline of key NHS reforms from 2002 through 2008 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20082007
Choice
pilots begin
for heart
disease and
elective
patients in
London
April 2004:
ŅPayment by
ResultsÓ for
20
Foundation
Trusts
Jan 2006:
All patients
can choose
from 4-5
providers.
ŅChoose and
BookÓ
system for
online
bookings.
NHS Choice
website
goes online.
Website has
provider
quality
information
Patients can
choose to
attend any
provider in
England for
care
Patients
waiting > 6
months can
choose
provider with
shorter wait
April 2005:
ŅPayment by
ResultsÓ for
all NHS
providers
 26
Figure 2: Trends in pre-surgery LOS, overall LOS and post-surgery LOS from 2002 
through 2008 
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Figure 3: Trends in overall LOS for the most competitive, somewhat competitive and 
least competitive hospitals 
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Figure 4: Trends in pre-surgery LOS in the most competitive, somewhat competitive 
and least competitive hospitals 
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Figure 5: Trends in post-surgery LOS in the most competitive, somewhat competitive 
and least competitive hospitals 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics for key variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Obs. Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min Max 
IMD2007 
Income 
Vector 
Hospital’s Annual 
Average of Patients’ 
Income vector of the 
2007 Index of Multiple 
Deprivations 1518 2.8981 0.6072 1.0000 5.0000 
Charlson 
Comorbidity 
Score 
Hospital’s Annual 
Average of Patients’ 
Charlston Charlson Co-
Moridity Score 1518 0.2545 0.2388 0.0000 6.0000 
Female Percentage of Hospital’s 
patients That are Female 1518 0.6168 0.0884 0.0000 1.0000 
Readm28 Hospital’s Annual 
Average 28-day 
Readmission Rate 1518 0.0689 0.0611 0.0000 1.0000 
Deathall30 Hospital’s Annual 30-
day Mortality Rate 1518 0.0052 0.0096 0.0000 0.2000 
LOS Hospital’s Average 
Annual LOS 1518 8.3823 1.9656 0.0000 22.0000 
Pre-surgery 
LOS 
Hospital’s Annual Pre-
Surgery LOS 1518 0.7332 0.4131 0.0000 4.0000 
Post-Surgery 
LOS 
Hospital’s Annual Post-
Surgery LOS 1518 7.6491 1.8247 0.0000 22.0000 
Site_Activity Number of Hip 
Replacements Performed 
per site per year 1517 240.3396 165.4844 30.0000 1147.0000
Negloghhi95
_2002_2005 
The negative log of the 
HHI measured in a 
variable radius market 
averaged across 2002-
2005 1518 0.7901 0.4165 0.1007 2.1696 
G_count_95s
h 
Count of hospitals within 
a variable radius market 
averaged across 2002 - 
2005 1518 6.1451 4.1225 1.5215 21.8977 
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Appendix 2: Full results for least-squared estimates of (5) with competition measured as 
the negative log of the HHI in a 95% variable radius market and pre-surgery LOS as 
the dependent variable  
nlhhi -0.1165 0.2184 
2003 * nlhhi -0.0273 0.0191 
2004 * nlhhi -0.0379 0.0281 
2005 * nlhhi -0.0681 0.0402 
2006 * nlhhi -0.1024* 0.0413 
2007 * nlhhi -0.1195* 0.0479 
2008 * nlhhi -0.1037* 0.0518 
2003 0.0126 0.0147 
2004 -0.0031 0.0227 
2005 0.0170 0.0334 
2006 -0.0350 0.0346 
2007 -0.1270* 0.0416 
2008 -0.2269*** 0.0476 
Comorbidity Score 0.0487 0.0444 
Age -0.0004 0.0105 
IMD2007_Income 0.0103 0.0513 
Site_Activity_150_300 -0.0244 0.0184 
Site_Activity_300_450 -0.0369 0.0264 
Site_Activity_450+ -0.0784 0.0492 
28-Day Readmission Rate -0.0981 0.2260 
30-Day Mortality Rate 1.2360 0.7646 
Average Distance Travelled 0.0000 0.0000 
% Female 0.1612 0.1366 
   
Obs 1518  
R2 0.069  
   
Patient characteristics: average annual patient age; average annual patient socioeconomic 
status measured using the income component of the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivations; 
patient gender; and average annual patient Charlson comorbidity score.   
 
Hospital characteristics: Number of procedures carried out at each hospital annually; annual 
hospital 30-day hip replacement mortality; and annual hospital 30-day readmission rate.   
 
Standard errors are clustered on hospital sites.  
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% ,*** Significant at 0.1% 
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